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Based on the notion that the brain is equipped with a hierarchical organization, which
embodies environmental contingencies across many time scales, this paper suggests
that the medial temporal lobe (MTL)—located deep in the hierarchy—serves as a bridge
connecting supra- to infra—MTL levels. Bridging the upper and lower regions of the
hierarchy provides a parallel architecture that optimizes information flow between upper
and lower regions to aid attention, encoding, and processing of quick complex visual
phenomenon. Bypassing intermediate hierarchy levels, information conveyed through the
MTL “bridge” allows upper levels to make educated predictions about the prevailing
context and accordingly select lower representations to increase the efficiency of
predictive coding throughout the hierarchy. This selection or activation/deactivation is
associated with endogenous attention. In the event that these “bridge” predictions are
inaccurate, this architecture enables the rapid encoding of novel contingencies. A review
of hierarchical models in relation to memory is provided along with a new theory, Medial-
temporal-lobe Conduit for Parallel Connectivity (MCPC). In this scheme, consolidation
is considered as a secondary process, occurring after a MTL-bridged connection, which
eventually allows upper and lower levels to access each other directly. With repeated
reactivations, as contingencies become consolidated, less MTL activity is predicted.
Finally, MTL bridging may aid processing transient but structured perceptual events, by
allowing communication between upper and lower levels without calling on intermediate
levels of representation.
Keywords: perception, memory, attention, free energy, hippocampus, medial temporal lobe, episodic memory
INTRODUCTION
The medial temporal lobe (MTL)—consisting of the hippocam-
pus and adjacent anatomically related cortex, including the
enorhinal, perirhinal, and parahippocampal corticies—has been
assigned a number of functions; however, a coherent and inclusive
functional definition remains elusive. A traditional view holds
that the hippocampus forms a unitary memory storage system—
along with other MTL structures (Squire and Zola-Morgan,
1991; Squire and Wixted, 2011). Another popular view holds
that the hippocampus mediates recollective memory rather than
familiarity-based recognition (Eldridge et al., 2000; Diana et al.,
2007; Shimamura, 2010; Yonelinas et al., 2010). Other work
suggests that MTL activity is not exclusive to memory, but is also
engaged during perceptual processing of complex scenes (Eacott
et al., 1994; Buckley et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2005; Lech and Suchan,
2013). Overall many different functions have been ascribed to the
MTL.
The primary aim of MTL Conduit for Parallel Connectiv-
ity (MCPC) is to view MTL functionality through the free
energy-hierarchical framework as opposed to a framework where
connections between perception, cognition, and memory are
not apparent. In order to convey this concept, this paper will
describe memory, cognition, perception, and attention like they
are separate processes while simultaneously introducing a frame-
work that demonstrates their fluent interconnections.
Medial temporal-lobe Conduit for Parallel Connectivity
focuses primarily on memory; however, attention and perception
are covered since they are fundamental to hierarchical infer-
ence. First, to contextualize the theoretical tenets of MCPC,
two pertinent theories of memory will be discussed: Standard
Model of Systems Consolidation (SMSC) and Multiple Trace
Theory (MTT). Second, a brief review of hierarchical gener-
ative models in relation to the free energy principal will be
supplied to serve as the foundation of MCPC. Afterwards, the
MCPC model is presented followed by a comparison to a
similar model, Predictive Interactive Multiple Memory Systems
(PIMMS) to further explain nuances of the framework pro-
posed. Finally, an attempt is made to clarify differences between
MTT and SMSC within the free energy-hierarchical frame-
work.
TWO PERTINENT MODELS OF HIPPOCAMPAL FUNCTION
Currently, two major theories make predictions regarding the
role of the hippocampus. The first is the SMSC, which holds that
the initial memory trace is simultaneously encoded in the cortex
and hippocampus (Squire and Alvarez, 1995). It states that the
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cortex is unable to initially contain the memory alone; however,
with support from the hippocampus, appropriate associative
connectivity forms within the cortex and the memory is stored.
Overall, SMSC predicts that the hippocampus is not required for
retrieval of remote memories, but is required for recent ones that
lack sufficient consolidation. It is implied that recent memories
are more susceptible to loss following hippocampal damage
secondary to incomplete consolidated; therefore, a retrograde
amnesia gradient is predicted.
Multiple Trace Theory was proposed as an alternative model
(Nadel and Moscovitch, 1997). In contrast to SMSC, MTT
proposes that the hippocampus has an important role in the
retrieval of all episodic memories, including remote ones. In
line with SMSC, MTT proposes that memories are encoded in
hippocampal-neocortical networks, but that each reactivation
results in a different trace in the hippocampus. It is presumed that
hippocampal traces are contextual and rich in spatial details; on
the other hand, cortical traces are presumed to be “semantic” and
largely context free.
The central conflict between these theories is the role of the
hippocampus in the retrieval of remote episode memories (Yassa
and Reagh, 2013), episodic memories being defined as memories
of specific events including times, places, and other contextual
information that can be explicitly stated. Multiple Trace Theory
predicts that hippocampal activation is required for episodic
memories regardless of how old they are; therefore, there is no
gradient for episodic memories.
As mentioned, SMSC predicts that a temporal graded retro-
grade amnesia manifests with MTL damage, given the assumption
that older memories rely less on the hippocampus. Indeed, initial
work with the amnestic patient H.M. demonstrated this; however,
it later became clear that neuropsychiatric testing limitations
of that era may not have adequately tested episodic memory
(Corkin, 2002). In retrospect it was asserted that H.M. was unable
to narrate even one event from his life that occurred at a specific
time or place. On the other hand, patient E.P., who had more
extensive MTL damage, retained highly detailed spatial memories
of his childhood neighborhood were preserved (Stefanacci et al.,
2000) arguing for a gradient. In turn, Rosenbaum et al., 2000
assessed patient K.C. who had extensive bilateral hippocampal
damage but also to other regions. K.C. had severe retrograde non-
gradient amnesia for autobiographical episodes but seemingly
preserved detailed memory of his childhood neighborhood as
well. However, upon closer inspection, it was discovered that
he experienced great difficulty separating lures from actual
landmarks in his neighborhood. Controls scored 45/48 and
46/48, but K.C. scored 15/48 (Rosenbaum et al., 2000). Basically
neither theory can be fully proven or disproven due to conflicting
clinical presentations and experimental results. Nevertheless, it
should be made explicitly clear that memories of a neighborhood
that were traversed thousands of times do not constitute episodic,
a memory of a single event. This observation will be discussed in
greater detail later.
HIERARCHICAL PERSPECTIVE
The organization of the brain recapitulates the hierarchical gen-
eration of sensations in the outside environment. In the world,
or “external reality,” lower hierarchy levels are predicted by the
upper levels. For example, the position of a ball can be deter-
mined by its velocity; velocity can be determined by acceleration,
and acceleration can be determined by jerk (rate of change in
acceleration)—over hierarchically nested timescales. This hier-
archical causal structure is thought to be recapitulated in the
hierarchical organization of the visual brain—for which there is
an overwhelming amount of physiological and anatomical evi-
dence. In this setting, the complexity of the brain increases from
caudal to rostral—and implicitly to higher or deeper hierarchical
levels of representation. The lower levels of the hierarchy are
associated with sensory input, for example the primary audi-
tory and visual cortex located in temporal and occipital regions
respectively. These unimodal (meaning only one sense) levels
are not directly interconnected to each other; however, they are
connected to upper transmodal levels (Mesulam, 1998). Trans-
modal levels bind sensory input from multiple sensory modalities
simultaneously. For example, words used in language are located
in transmodal areas because they simultaneously hold visual
and auditory associations (Mesulam, 1998). In transmodal areas,
neuronal communication occurs within and between hierarchical
levels. Relatively, lower levels represent information closer to
sensory channels, while higher levels pertain to more abstract
representations or “memories” that provide top-down predic-
tions of lower-level expectations. In a simplified example, top
level representations can hold broad contextual categories such
as “office”; whereas, middle representations hold items such as
chair, desk, cubicle, while lower representations contain graph-
ical elements such as line, square, etc. Essentially, upper levels
are composed of clusters of lower representations. In the office
example, upper levels predict chairs, chairs predict chair legs, legs
predict metal, plastic, or wood, etc. If descending predictions do
not match upward sensory information, then “prediction errors”
form which are passed upward to update and improve higher level
expectations.
THE FREE ENERGY PRINCIPAL AND HIERARCHICAL MODELS
By considering the brain as an organ of prediction or inference—
based on hierarchical generative models—the work of Karl
Friston explains certain aspects of memory, perception, and
action (Friston, 2008, 2009, 2010; Kiebel et al., 2008). This work
formalizes long-standing notions about the brain as generating
hypotheses or explanations to explain the sensory input in
terms of Bayesian inference. More specifically, it considers action
and perception in terms of minimizing surprise or free energy.
Surprise roughly translates to the difference between internal
representations of reality vs. reality itself. The free energy principle
suggests that adaptive systems (like the brain) that contend with
a changing environment minimize surprise about sensory input.
Mathematically, surprise is quantified by −ln p(y(a)|m), where
y(a) is sensory input sampled under some action a, and m
represents the hierarchical model that is entailed by the brain
(Kiebel et al., 2008). If surprise is roughly the difference between
internal representations of reality vs. reality itself, then the brain
would have to know “true reality” in order to determine the
difference. Obviously the brain lacks a “true reality map”; there-
fore, it relies on determining the lack of agreement or alignment
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between internal hierarchy levels, free energy—an upper limit on
surprise (Friston, 2008, 2009). By aligning hierarchy levels, free
energy is minimized. The concept of phonetic ambiguity may
illustrate this more clearly. The verbal phrase “your children”
sounds identical to “you’re children”. The listener minimizes sur-
prise by aligning the broad categorical context, teacher speaking
to parent or parent talking to child respectively; as a result,
internal hierarchy agreement helps the brain determine what
outside reality may be. A way to put this mathematically, free
energy is always slightly greater than surprise and, under some
simplifying assumptions, reduces to the amount of prediction
error, distributed over the hierarchy (Friston, 2009). Therefore,
minimizing free energy minimizes prediction error and implicitly
surprise. Action is used to align the outside world to inter-
nal representations; thereby, decreasing free energy as well. For
example, before lifting one’s hand, the internal representation of
hand lifts and the brain notices a discrepancy from incoming
sensory information depicting a resting hand vs. the internal
representation of a lifted one. In order to align the outside world
with the internal representation, action is used to lift the hand
to match the internal representation. For the sake of simplicity
however, action will not be discussed since the focus is memory,
attention, and perception.
Within this framework, a working definition of attention
is supplied. Attention is defined as the precision of, or con-
fidence placed in, prediction errors. This means that attend-
ing to certain sensory streams or hierarchical representations
corresponds to amplifying prediction errors in the appropriate
sensory channels or hierarchical levels—so that these prediction
errors have privileged access to higher hierarchical expectations.
In other words, attention is the process of optimizing preci-
sion, through mechanisms such as synaptic gain amplification.
Crucially, attention controls the relative influence of (top-down)
prior expectations relative to (bottom-up) sensory evidence or
prediction errors (Friston, 2009). Another way to explain this
is that attention creates better communication between certain
hierarchy levels, so that they can be aligned with maximum
efficiency. In a hypothetical example, a soldier caught in a fire
fight, would increase interconnectivity between lower hierarchical
levels to better identify somatosensory information to increase
chances of survival. Attention is placed on sensory processing
at the expense of novel abstract thought. On the other hand,
an author writing a book would presumably increase intercon-
nectivity (attention) between mid to high hierarchy levels in
order to convert abstract thought into words in a meaning-
ful way, a process that does not require intense somatosensory
attention.
In terms of neurophysiology, connections that pass prediction
errors up the hierarchy are superficial pyramidal cells.
Interestingly, these cells are primarily responsible for EEG
signals that can be measured non-invasively. It is possible that
oscillation patterns such as gamma, alpha, and delta waves are
byproducts of attention on distinct levels of the hierarchy. On the
other hand, sources of backward connections are largely the deep
pyramidal cells which are believed to encode the expected causes
of sensory states (Mumford, 1992; Friston, 2009).
INTRODUCING A CENTRIPETAL HIERARCHICAL
ASSOCIATIVE MODEL OF MEMORY AND PERCEPTION
The boundary between perception and memory is not concrete
(Cabeza, 2008; Cabeza et al., 2008; Friston, 2009, 2010). For
example, there is currently a debate regarding the role of the
hippocampus in memory and perception. Is the hippocampus
primarily used in memory, perception, or both? It can be said
that an individual perceives their memories while dreaming—
a perception that requires no sensory input. Through the free
energy framework the connections between memory and percep-
tion become apparent.
In this synthesis, a pyramidal hierarchical associative model
of memory, based on (Friston, 2008), is presented that serves to
facilitate a better understanding of hierarchical generative models
and the constant predictive coding. The goal is to convey concepts
intuitively and schematically—so that readers who are unfamil-
iar with the technical terminology appreciate the basic idea.
Figure 1, depicts the associative hierarchy ranging from simple
sensory elements such as “lines” up to abstract elements that
simultaneously bind lower elements. Traversing up and down the
hierarchical levels represents one (hierarchical) dimension of the
model (Mesulam, 1998). Neuroanatomical considerations would
place the top (or center) of the hierarchy in the frontal lobes e.g.,
orbitofrontal cortex (Kiebel et al., 2008), intermediate hierarchical
levels for example in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (Kiebel
et al., 2008), and sensory areas at the lowest level (Mesulam, 1998;
Kiebel et al., 2008). In this dimension, the MTL is located between
the intermediate and upper levels. Given this framework, one may
ask if it is correct treating the brain as homogenous or categori-
cally uniform. If one defines the function of the whole brain as
minimizing free energy, then it is possible. For example, the cere-
bellum plays a crucial role in generating predictions for perceptual
and movement trajectories, consistent with lower levels.
The second aspect, within the model, considers memory
within a hierarchy level; where a memory can occupy inter-
and intra-hierarchical levels simultaneously. In other words, any
given expectation or memory is bound within and between
hierarchies—endowing memories with a distributed (between
level) aspect and a representational (within level) content of
greater or lesser sensory detail (Mesulam, 1998).
EXPLICITLY COUPLING MEMORY WITH TIME
This model is consistent with other work that emphasizes time
scales embedded within the hierarchy (Kiebel et al., 2008). The
lowest level of the hierarchy corresponds to fast (seconds to
milliseconds) fluctuations associated with sensory processing of
a quickly changing sensorium. On the other hand, the high-
est levels encode slow contextual (conceptual) changes in the
environment that can last weeks, months, and possibly a life-
time. In a sense, the lower levels have a faster “refresh rate”
relative to higher levels. This faster rate may result from being
closer to frequently changing sensory channels and being used
by multiple higher representations. The framework proposed by
Kiebel et al. (2008) also follows a neuroanatomical organization
where hierarchical complexity increases moving from caudal to
rostral.
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FIGURE 1 | An aligned memory residing simultaneously intra-hierarchically and inter-hierarchically. Lower hierarchical levels contain rich sensory
representations such as color, texture, smell. Notice that the frontal cortices are located at the top and center.
According to this MCPC, the brain contains distributed
aspects of the “same” memory, across all levels of the hierarchy,
each level holding different levels of detail through different time
spans. For example, a person looks at a picture of neighborhood
for ten seconds, and then the picture is removed. Immediately
afterwards, he can recall the picture with extreme detail; such
as the number of cars, color of leaves, how many people are
in the picture, and what color clothing they are wearing. This
detail is represented in lower levels of hierarchy. As representa-
tions in the lower levels quickly decay, upper levels are called
upon to retrieve the more abstract semantics associated with the
scene, given a slower rate of decay. In fact, the phenomenon
commonly described as “short-term memory” may be, in part,
a manifestation of the dynamic nature of low-level expectations
that have fast time constants and decay quickly (Mesulam, 1998).
Indeed, the decay of expectations during hierarchical perceptual
inference has been proposed as an explanation for binocular
rivalry, where different percepts compete for dominance (Hohwy
et al., 2008). Returning to the example, with the passage of time,
the person may recall vague generalizations such as trees, cars,
and people. A month later, when asked to recall the picture
(assuming no intentional review or rehearsal was engaged) the
person may give a more contextual account such as “a neigh-
borhood street”. This phenomenon may be viewed as different
versions of the same memory accessed at different hierarchical
levels.
What the literature currently calls “source memory” may
actually reflect lower levels of this hierarchy. For example,
source memory can include contextual features such as color
or visual elements such as location. The hierarchical (pyrami-
dal) framework may also explain why patients with damage to
high level associations cortex, located in the prefrontal cortex
(PFC), exhibit mild to moderate impairments in detail rich
retrieval (Mangels et al., 1996; Hwang et al., 2007; Shimamura,
2011). On the other hand, patients can have highly detailed
false memories—presumably by activating inappropriate featural
representations at lower levels in a top-down fashion. Similar
mechanisms for false inference (e.g., hallucinations and delu-
sions) in psychosis have been proposed that rest upon a loss of
alignment—mediated by a failure of classical modulatory neuro-
transmission that is thought to encode attention (Adams et al.,
2013). Put simply, false memories and hallucination and delusions
may reflect an inability to attend to the appropriate hierarchy
levels during retrieval and encoding respectively.
A UNIFIED DEFINITION OF MEMORY AND PERCEPTION
The definitions of perception, encoding and retrieval are usu-
ally considered independently, but here they are collapsed into
one simple definition: finding the maximum consilience among
hierarchical levels through the process of attaining alignment.
In technical terms, this entails the minimization of free energy
(Friston, 2008, 2010; Henson and Gagnepain, 2010). In a sense,
free energy can be viewed as a lack of alignment within hierarchi-
cal inference and its minimization corresponds to the creation of
alignment. Encoding and perception will be considered synony-
mous for simplicity—and both involve a minimization of (pre-
cise) prediction errors throughout the hierarchy. Through this
perspective, memory is not simply a recording of past experiences;
instead, it becomes indivisible from perception and cognition.
In a hypothetical example, a middle age man in therapy recalls
how his college girlfriend broke up with him with the explanation
that he was not attentive to her needs. Recalling this memory
through a more experienced contextual understanding of the
world, other memories come to mind. He also recalls that one
of his buddies broke up with his girlfriend several weeks before
the patient’s breakup. Suddenly, he realizes that his girlfriend
may have ended the relationship because her secret crush was
available, especially since they began dating shortly after their
breakup. Here, a memory is recalled; however, it is altered when
an overarching context explains seemingly unrelated events. Free
energy is minimized and the memory will never be the same due
to recontextualization.
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FIGURE 2 | Parallel and Serial Alignment. (A) Parallel alignment of hierarchy levels mediated by the MTL followed by consolidation. (B) Demonstrating serial
alignment of a completely consolidated representation without the MTL involvement.
The process of alignment can be guided from the top, bot-
tom, or both (Friston, 2008, 2010). It may depend on which
hierarchy level is inferred to have the strongest representa-
tion, such that the precision of the alignment empowers that
particular level in guiding other levels. The weaker may “ori-
ent” to the stronger, but alignment is not a unilateral pro-
cess: both the bottom and top levels “orient” each other until
hierarchical consilience is achieved; however, the weakest level
does most of the “orienting to”. In perception, the bottom
is usually strongest and most stable due to precise sensory
data from sensory channels; consequently, the top will ori-
ent to the bottom. In contrast, memory recall usually involves
higher representations having more precision than bottom up
influences—due to lower decay rates. Consequently, the bottom
does most of the orienting to, relative to the top during the process
of recall-alignment (or indeed dreaming). In computational
terms, this process is labeled as pattern completion where a sparse
cue may trigger a rich recollection via recurrent interactions
between broad upper level representations and detailed lower
level representations.
As outlined above, many roles have been attributed to the
MTL. Many theories posit that the hippocampus, sitting on top
of the hierarchy bind distant cortical regions during memory
formation (Shimamura, 2011). MCPC diverges from this account
and suggests that the MTL serves a conduit, through which supra-
MTL levels interface with infra-MTL levels, via pathways that
skip hierarchy levels; consequently the MTL or hippocampus
resides in the middle of the hierarchy and not the apex. It should
be made clear that direct communication between higher and
lower hierarchical levels can occur without the MTL, via serial
connectivity between consecutive levels in the cortex; however,
it is supposed that the MTL is required for skipping levels
and establishing a parallel connectivity between high and low
levels. Within this framework, the MTL is just a relay; conse-
quently, it is not responsible for binding event features per se;
instead, the binding comes from above-hippocampal-hierarchy
associations that access lower levels through the hippocampus
and vice versa. The connections are reciprocal; thus allowing
upper hierarchies to receive sensory information more quickly
than the information ascending serially through all levels of the
cortical hierarchy. In turn, the upper levels can send predic-
tions to lower and mid-levels before being fully informed by
serial bottom-up hierarchical inference. This “fast lane” approach
may have evolved to overcome temporal limitations in species
with expansive multimodal association areas, specifically in fast
changing environments (Mesulam, 1998). Lower and middle
levels that have been predicted by upper levels—via the MTL—
enjoy top-down selection that contextualize the predictive coding
through selecting appropriate processing channels (e.g., through
top-down precision control or attention). This distinction can
have a profound influence on what is attended to and remem-
bered as the flood of sensory information serially sweeps up
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the hierarchy, a phenomenon that can be viewed from differ-
ent perspectives. For example, it can be viewed as attention
from the frontal cortices working through the hippocampus
to “filter out” irrelevant information (Mesulam, 1998). From
Friston’s perspective, it can represent how higher hierarchies
predict the relative precision of prediction errors in lower levels
to make predictive coding and learning more efficient. Psycholog-
ically, it may be construed in terms of (endogenous) attentional
selection.
A PROPOSED ROLE FOR THE MTL
It is proposed that two forms of alignment coexist, serial and
parallel alignment (see Figure 2). In serial alignment, juxtaposed
hierarchy levels reciprocally align each other. On the other hand,
parallel alignment can occur between non-juxtaposed hierarchy
levels via MTL mediated skipping or bridging—a theme that
will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. Serial and
parallel alignment may occur simultaneously (Mesulam, 1998).
Indeed, such an arrangement has been demonstrated in lower
visual association areas (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Mesulam,
1998). The concepts of different hierarchical time scales and
interconnections between levels have been presented in order
to present the next point: from a memory perspective, MTL
mediated parallel alignment may afford lower levels a degree
of temporal decay protection through descending coordination
by upper levels. This may explain the requisite role of the hip-
pocampus in conditions where conditioned and unconditioned
stimuli are separated by a temporal gap but not where they
overlap in time (Solomon et al., 1986; Clark and Squire, 1998).
It is possible that the lack of temporal separation preserves
the low-level representations from decay; reducing dependency
on the MTL. On the other hand, after certain intervals, more
support from higher levels, mediated via the MTL is required.
With time, it is possible that this type of prediction/protection
allows hierarchical consolidation to occur, a topic discussed
later.
Assuming MTL activity correlates with the number of non-
adjacent representations bound, this model predicts less MTL
activity when information within low-mid level hierarchies has
a high ratio of consolidation/non-consolidation. For example,
if a native English speaker meets a man who says, “Hello, my
name is John”. Upon hearing the word “name”, supra-MTL
hierarchies presumably predict associative areas holding names;
as a result, the representation “John”, having enjoyed an extra
boost (or greater precision), becomes bound via the MTL. It
is presumed that the native English speaker has a consolidated
representation of the name “John”. On the other hand, the native
English speaker meets a man who says, “Hello, my name is
Muktakashi”. It’s doubtful that the same associative area holds
a consolidated representation of “Muktakashi”. Medial tempo-
ral lobe skipping must skip to lower phonetic-containing hier-
archical levels; consequently, MTL activity increases because
of more elementary or detailed “fragments” to bind (see
Figure 3).
The same phenomenon can explain increased MTL activity
when something unexpected is perceived (Henson and Gag-
nepain, 2010). In the butcher shop example, it is predicted
that MTL activity increases when an item (butcher) exists in
an unlikely context (office), because these two representations
are held on non-adjacent hierarchy levels and a consolidated
context-representation of butcher-in-office does not exist. On
the other hand, MTL activity is less if the butcher is seen at
the butcher shop. In a simplified hypothetical example illus-
trated in Figure 4, upon walking into a butcher shop, lower
levels align the top to the context of “butcher shop”; as a
result, the top selects associations contained in the category
“butcher shop”. This top level prediction is in agreement with
serially ascending perceptual input of the butcher standing behind
the counter; consequently there is minimal surprise and min-
imal need for MTL bridging and consolidation. In a differ-
ent scenario, a computer programmer walks into his office.
Prior to walking in, perceptual cues from lower levels activate
top level context predictions via the MTL. In turn, top lev-
els select categorical representations related to the office set-
ting. Walking into his office, he sees a butcher. Immediately
there is a clash between top-down contextual predictions and
serially ascending perceptual content. Unlike the foreign name
example, where the intermediate representation (of the foreign
name) was missing; this time, the top level category represen-
tation is inadequate since the butcher has never been seen in
the office context. This time, the MTL bridges the mid-level
butcher representation to the upper level office context rep-
resentations; consequently, the top level categorical association
becomes realigned.
CONSOLIDATION
In partial agreement with other theories, it is proposed that
the initial skip-binding, or parallel alignment of hierarchy levels
initiates an automatic process of structuring intermediate levels.
In other words, the hierarchy levels between initially bound lower
and upper hierarchy levels, for a specific memory, consolidate
themselves for optimal future alignment after the perceptual or
learning event has taken place. It is proposed that with sufficient
consolidation, hierarchy levels can align via serial hierarchical
connections vs. reliance on parallel alignment; consequently, the
MTL does less work because serial alignment replaces skip-
ping Figure 2. In many, studies different types of memories
are tested including autobiographical, episodic, semantic, faces,
famous faces, and events. In this framework, it is proposed that
the ratio of consolidation to non-consolidation determines the
degree of MTL involvement rather than the above classifica-
tions. It is proposed that consolidation is correlated to time
and total number of alignments. Alignment can be initiated
consciously or subconsciously via bottom-up, top-down, and
affective activation. Bottom-up alignment can include walking
in one’s neighborhood every day. Top down could be repeti-
tive rehearsal such as saying a prayer every morning. Affective
induced alignment may manifest as a trauma playing over and
over again secondary to emotional value. Under this schema,
one can imagine that a unique episode re-aligns relatively less
often than walking through one’s neighborhood. Famous faces
and specific events may happen more frequently; however, it is
highly idiosyncratic. On the other hand, walking through one’s
neighborhood and semantic knowledge are frequently realigned
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FIGURE 3 | Demonstrates alignment of consolidated vs. non-consolidated representations.
events; therefore, they would have the highest consolidation/non-
consolidation ratio. Linguistic phrases would be expected to
have high consolidation since they are produced and discerned
frequently.
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FIGURE 4 | In-context vs. out-context alignment. The first scenario
depicts a situation where the top level representation, containing the
context, adequately predicts the situation. This contrasts to the second
scenario where the top representation does not accurately predict the
situation; as a result, it becomes updated by lower levels via the
MTL.
CONSOLIDATION IN RELATION TO SLEEP AND DEFAULT
MODE NETWORK ACTIVITY
Upper to mid-level consolidation may occur during sleep and
default mode network activity, when attention is not fixated on
lower hierarchy levels. Indeed, the essential role of sleep has
been discussed in terms of optimizing alignment in hierarchical
generative models through minimizing complexity (redundancy).
This provides a simple perspective on the neurochemistry of
sleep and the sensory gating associated with dreaming (Hobson
and Friston, 2012)—and introspection (reflection) during default
mode network activity (Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010).
THE FORMATION OF NON-DECLARATIVE MEMORIES VIA
BOTTOM-UP ALIGNMENT
Based on what has been proposed so far, it would be expected
that long term memories cannot form without the MTL;
however, clinical experience shows otherwise. Patients with
bilateral MTL damage have been shown to navigate in new
houses or neighborhoods—after some time—but without the
ability to declare how they navigated (Stefanacci et al., 2000).
To understand how “non-declarative” memories form without
the temporal protection of higher hierarchies, the mechanism
of temporal protection must be considered: in essence, higher
levels maintain a specific alignment pattern in lower hierarchi-
cal levels, so that consolidation occurs. The same phenomenon
can be recreated if input from lower hierarchy levels—namely,
perception—is kept sufficiently constant. In other words, if
someone with MTL damage navigates an environment long
enough, the lower hierarchy levels will be repeated a sufficient
number of times to consolidate without requiring higher level
temporal protection or contextual guidance. The next question
is why the patient cannot access or declare their memory. To
resolve this paradox, it is proposed that the alignment process
is dissociated from upper hierarchy levels. Lacking connection
to higher levels will prevent this memory from being con-
sciously accessed or declared, a dissociated memory. In other
words, a disconnection between high and low level representa-
tions precludes the formation of more abstract memories that
presumably constitute the content of access consciousness. In
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terms of predictive coding, this is a natural consequence of
removing bottom-up prediction errors that are necessary for
the formation and learning of concepts in terms of high level
expectations.
RELATING THE CENTRIPETAL HIERARCHICAL FRAMEWORK
TO PERCEPTION
As touched upon earlier, perception can be explained by the
centripetal hierarchical associative model as well. Driving infor-
mation straight from sensory channels, the bottom levels may
become relatively stronger than upper hierarchical levels. In a
sense, this becomes the reverse of memory, where top levels are
usually stronger than the bottom. As opposed to “recall”, align-
ment in the opposite direction is the phenomenon of (exogenous
attentional) orientation; consequently, detail rich components
orient to a broad context, the upper hierarchy levels. This is
consistent with attentional adjustments to the precision of pre-
diction errors, through adjusting neuromodulatory or cortical
gain selectively at different hierarchical levels. In recollection,
introspection, and sleep there is an attenuation of sensory or low-
level precision; while during alert waking perception, there is the
converse increase in sensory precision: see (Feldman and Friston,
2010) and (Brown et al., 2013) for a simulations of this in terms of
predictive coding, biased competition and classical psychophysics
experiments.
Some recent literature discusses a possible role of the MTL
in perception. From the bottom-up perspective, skipping may
allow an irrelevant sea of intermediate representations to be
bypassed in order to reach appropriate upper level processing.
This may be adaptive in situations where speed is essential. In
studies looking at monkeys with perirhinal cortex (PRC) damage
(located within the MTL), there was a disruption in simultaneous
and zero-delay matching-to-sample of perceptually similar object
stimuli (Eacott et al., 1994) and impairment in discrimination
of simultaneously presented objects that share a high number of
visual features—or objects that are shown from different points
of view (Buckley et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2012). Another study,
looking at amnestic patients with MTL damage, found that the
hippocampus is essential for discriminating scenes with a high
degree of overlap, while the PRC is required for discriminat-
ing scenes and faces with high overlap of features (Lee et al.,
2005). Interestingly, these deficits existed in the context of intact
perception of simple visual features such as color and size (Lee
et al., 2012). As discussed above, upper hierarchy levels may need
to “inform” lower levels to resolve intra-hierarchical conflict or
ambiguity; however, such processing would not be necessary for
simple visual features.
Recalling patient K.C., who had detailed memories of his
neighborhood but inability to tell lures from actual landmarks,
a similarity emerges with the above experimental findings. Medial
temporal lobe damaged appears to impair both discrimination of
simultaneously presented images that share visual features and
memories from the distant past vs. images that share visual fea-
tures. Here it is proposed that upper hierarchy levels are bridged
via the MTL to resolved conflict in non-adjacent lower levels
regardless of whether it is a distant memory or simultaneously
presented image.
PREDICTIVE, INTERACTIVE MULTIPLE MEMORY SYSTEMS
AND MCPC
The Predictive, Interactive Multiple Memory Systems (PIMMS)
model most closely resembles the framework of MCPC. A major
emphasis of PIMMS is that memory encoding and retrieval
occurs, via reciprocal interconnections between hierarchical
levels with the aim of minimizing prediction error, the same
as MCPC (Henson and Gagnepain, 2010). In order to convey
important concepts, PIMMS divides memory hierarchies into
three types/levels: episodic, semantic, and perceptual. Instead
of looking at the MTL as one functional unit, PIMMS looks at
certain components of the MTL and other regions in relation
memory types. They designate the hippocampus and PRC, both
components of the MTL, as key parts of the episodic and semantic
systems respectively. Predictive, Interactive Multiple Memory
Systems states that the key function of the hippocampus is to
optimize the mutual predictability between items and context.
It states that mutual predictability corresponds to the joint
probability of predicting an item from a context and predicting
a context from an item. For example, “representations of the cur-
rent context is used by the hippocampus to predict items that are
likely to appear in that context” (Henson and Gagnepain, 2010).
This is closely related to the concept of alignment; especially when
canst in terms of top-down predictions of context and attentional
(or precision based) selection of lower-level representations.
Furthermore, Predictive, interactive multiple memory systems
model is one of the first to describe how predictions can be
framed within the hierarchical interactive memory system view
(Henson and Gagnepain, 2010). PIMMS also distinguishes
an acute from delayed component of encoding, analogous to
encoding and consolidation respectively; although, the mechanics
of consolidation are not explored in contrast to MCPC.
Divergent to MCPC, PIMMS places the hippocampus at the
apex of the hierarchy; thus, the hippocampus is defined as the
component doing the predicting. As discussed already, MCPC
defines the hippocampus as a mid-level conduit for parallel con-
nectivity with upper hierarchies; therefore, upper hierarchies are
doing the predicting. Another contrast is that this MCPC looks
at the MTL as a whole rather than dividing it. The question of
whether the MTL serves one function vs. multiple is dependent
on the definition of “function”. Medialtemporal-lobe Conduit for
Parallel Connectivity defines this function as bridging upper to
lower representations to allow parallel processing; therefore, it
is possible to view the MTL as a unit serving one function. By
placing the hippocampus in the middle of the hierarchy, MCPC
is able to distinguish between two types of hierarchical alignment:
serial vs. parallel, a distinction that can explain some subtleties of
consolidation.
REVISITING SMSC AND MTT
Going back to SMSC and MTT theories of memory, they are
both partially in agreement with MCPC. According to MCPC,
with sufficient re-alignments, a memory becomes sufficiently
consolidated thus requiring minimal MTL activity, at least in
most recall tasks (e.g., conditions with minimal conflict). On the
other hand, in episodic memories that do not align often and
lack sufficient consolidation, MTL bridging becomes mandatory
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for detailed recall regardless of memory age. Medialtemporal-lobe
Conduit for Parallel Connectivity explicitly explores the difference
between detail rich episodic memories vs. detail recollection of
a childhood neighborhood. The latter enjoys frequent bottom-
up alignment thus increasing consolidation rates. Furthermore,
it is possible that childhood memories are encoded with higher
precision, given that language accents form after a certain age;
however, this is out of the scope of this paper. According to MCPC
bottom-up alignment may occur independent of MTL function.
In addition, MCPC predicts that MTL bridging is required for
certain tasks regardless of full memory consolidation. Such tasks
include lure discrimination where lower levels need direct access
to high level predictions to reduce conflict. In other words, MTL
bridging adds additional dimensions of recollection, ones that
become visible through a hierarchical free energy perspective.
These additional dimensions are not limited to recall, but can also
involve recontextualization as in the case of the patient recalling
a college breakup. In summary, MTL function can occur during
recollection of fully consolidated memory; however, it is not vital
for basic recollection. This finding may reconcile MTT’s evidence
that medial temporal fMRI activity was equally predictive of
recent and remote memory retrieval (Nadel and Moscovitch,
1997) with SMSC’s observation that amnesiacs can have rich recall
of childhood neighbors. However, great caution must be exercised
with studies looking at MTL activation since consolidation for
other memories may occur in parallel with the task at hand.
PREDICTIONS OF MCPC
Looking at prior memory experiments, it is clear that testing
memory can prove difficult. One difficulty is that terminology
such as “episodic” or “semantic” have a degree of ambiguity.
Another problem is that memory and perception can be highly
idiosyncratic. One method to test certain predictions of MCPC is
correlating MTL activity to new language acquisition. The speech
of patient H.M., K.C., and E.P. was relatively spared; therefore,
MTL is not essential for well consolidated speech. However,
MCPC predicts that a subtle gradient may exist for secondary
languages that have not enjoyed the same number of alignments
with high precision encoding.
The study can observe MTL activity in 3 groups. In the first
group, MTL activity is assessed while speaking the native lan-
guage. In the second group, MTL activity is assessed through time
as subjects learn a foreign language. It is predicted that MTL activ-
ity in the second group will be higher than the first, will decrease
over time, and will not drop below the first. The third group will
consist of fluent bilinguals who acquired the second language after
age eleven. It is predicted that the third group will have MTL
activity between the first 2 groups during specific speech acts.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the main function of MCPC is to view the MTL
through the free energy paradigm as opposed to a framework
where the connections between perception, cognition, and mem-
ory are not apparent. Through the free energy paradigm percep-
tion, memory, cognition, action, and attention are interdependent
processes that function, on a hierarchy, to lower free energy. This
perspective can resolve contradictions in research findings such
as preserved non-declarative memory in MTL damaged patients,
detailed childhood memories of locations but not episodes,
inability to distinguish objects that share common features with
MTL damage, and continued MTL activity on presumably con-
solidated memories.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
One major element that MCPC lacks is how memory, perception,
and action interact with emotion. Indeed, research demonstrates
a great deal of interaction between emotion, perception, and
memory (Pourtois et al., 2012). It is certainly not a coincidence
that the amygdala, a major affective center, is located in the
MTL. Further work may aim to integrate affective and cognitive
components to discover a more thorough understanding of this
topic. By integrating the role of emotions in minimizing free
energy, a more complete view of brain functioning may form.
Another application of the free energy hierarchical perspective
can be in child development. How does development correlate
to hierarchical development? For example, when infants gain
the ability to distinguish self from others, does that correlate
to the formations of contextual representations of self/others
within upper hierarchies? It may even explain why early traumas
profoundly influence patients for a lifetime or why accents form
when language is acquired after a certain age. The applications
certainly seem limitless at this point.
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